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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
The decision of the United District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri in the case of Holbrook v. Moore, in view of all the facts recited
seems to be logical and just. The decision is somewhat similar to that given
in the case of Jackson v. Smietanka (Treasury decision 3159, published in
the June issue of The Journal of Accountancy). It involves a matter of
additional salary being given an officer of a corporation for services ren
dered in a number of previous years, and the returning of the said additional
compensation as taxable income in the year when actually determined. The
taxpayer having overdrawn his account each year for a number of years
and having been granted in 1918 a substantial portion of said overdraft as
extra compensation sought to pro rate the additional amount as income over
the years in which the services were rendered. This was denied to him and
the total additional compensation was ruled to be taxable income in the
year 1918.
Exempt corporations are treated of in treasury decision 3164. This
decision sets out clearly that which the regulations have as clearly indi
cated, that a corporation organized for profit, though its activities be that of
an educational character, is not exempt from federal income and profits
taxes.
It is interesting to note that in this case the taxpayer seeks to deduct
from taxable income the cost of furniture and fixtures, buildings and “other
necessary improvements.” It seems strange, at this late day, that anyone
should expect to deduct items of the kind named.
(T. D. 3161.)
Income tax—Act of October 3, 1913—Decision of court.
1. Income—Additional Salary of Officer of Corporation, Subsequently
Authorized, Offset by Overdrafts Already Made.
Where, relying on the unofficial promises of a majority of the board of
directors that additional salary would be voted him for past years, the
president of a corporation overdrew his account with the corporation, addi
tional salary, subsequently voted, was income to him for the year in which
the amount thereof was finally settled upon and segregated by an order of
the board, although he had actually received and spent the money, as over
drafts, prior to that year.
2. Same—Invalidity of Vote of Additional Salary—Estoppel by In
come-tax Return.
Where the corporation deducted the additional salary of the president
when it made its income-tax return, the validity of the order of the board
granting such additional salary can not be questioned, although such presi
dent’s vote as director of the corporation was necessary to pass the order,
and the minority directors and the stockholders have never acquiesced
therein.
Treasury Department,
Office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Washington, D. C.
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To collectors of internal revenue and others concerned:
The appended decision of the United States district court for the eastern
district of Missouri, dated February 8, 1921, in the case of W. J. Holbrook
v. George H. Moore, collector, is published for the information of internalrevenue officers and others concerned.
M. F. West,
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Approved May 3, 1921:
A. W. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
No. 5161.
W. J. Holbrook, plaintiff, v. George H. Moore, collector, defendant.
Submitted to the court sitting as jury, on an agreed statement of facts.
[Decided Feb. 8, 1921.]
Oral opinion of the court: This case was submitted to the court sitting
as a jury, and a jury being specially waived in writing, the court heard the
testimony and the arguments of counsel, and has since considered the briefs
filed on both sides.
The facts are somewhat unique, and I confess just a little difficulty with
the case. Plaintiff is president of a real-estate company doing business here
in the city of St. Louis. He is also, of course, a director in that company.
He and two others of the directors (of whom there are five in all) made
the orders and passed the resolutions to which I shall hereafter refer. The
remaining two directors had nothing to do with these orders and resolutions.
Plaintiff and the two directors having to do with the resolution that I
shall mention owned 75 per cent. of the capital stock; 25 per cent. is in the
hands of other stockholders, presumably in the hands, among others, of
the two directors not taking part in the orders and resolutions to which I
have before referred.
In the years preceding March 1, 1913, the date at which the income-tax
act took effect, that is, the act of October 3, 1913, plaintiff was the active
manager of the corporation of which he is director and president. The
affairs of his corporation seem to have been very successful and profitable.
It was deemed by plaintiff and two of the directors that his services for the
years 1909, 1910, 1911, and 1912 were such as reasonably to entitle him to
additional compensation to that allowed him by the rules and by-laws of
the board of directors. No agreement as to the amount of that compensa
tion was ever arrived at by anybody up until December, 1913.
Plaintiff relying, as he says, upon the promise of two directors, became
indebted to the company, and this indebtedness was carried on the books of
the company as overdrafts. These overdrafts of plaintiff amounted in
December, 1913, to about $70,000. In this month and year (plaintiff and two
other directors concurring) plaintiff was allowed a credit upon the books of
the company for $50,000, leaving the plaintiff owing the company at that
time $20,000 on his overdrafts. Although seven years have passed, neither
the other two directors, nor the stockholders, have ever affirmatively acqui
esced in this allowance, although plaintiff was given credit for it upon the
books of the company in December, 1913, in the sum that I have heretofore
stated—$50,000.
In the year 1913 the Holbrock-Blackwelder Real Estate Trust Co. (I
believe this is the exact style of it) made out its return as it was required
to do by the law then in force, as a basis of assessment against it of an
income tax for the year 1913. It may have been, perhaps, in January, 1914,
but that cuts no figure in the case. In this return it took credit for the
$50,000 that it had allowed to plaintiff on its books, as an expense. It is
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true that it happened, fortuitously, that the company during the year 1913
had lost $76,000, so that it had to pay no income tax at all. It would not
have had to pay it in any event.
Upon this $50,000 so carried to the credit of plaintiff upon the books of
his company in 1913, the defendant assessed against him an income tax
amounting to, I believe, $990.36. This tax the plaintiff paid. After the
usual procedure, he brought suit against the defendant, Moore, in order to
secure a refund. The question is whether this tax was correctly or incor
rectly assessed against him under the law then in force. I have reached
the conclusion that it was.
Up until December, 1913, and on the 28th of the month, I believe, there
had never been an ascertainment of the amount that plaintiff should have
from the company as additional compensation; that matter was left unde
termined. It is true that he had gotten the money and had spent it in the
years preceding the taking effect of the income-tax act of October, 1913.
Upon the books of the company he owed it overdrafts not only for the
$50,000, but for an amount largely in excess of that sum. Up to that time
he had never gotten it and it was not certain that he ever would get it.
But at this time the credit to come to him was finally settled upon and
segregated by an order of the board. It may be said, since only two mem
bers of the board (in addition to plaintiff himself) acquiesced in this, that
therefore it was no order, and that since the other two directors and the
stockholders have never to this good day acquiesced in it, that it was no
order. I take it, that the company is foreclosed by the fact that they took
credit for it when they made their income-tax return for the year following
the year at which they passed this credit to plaintiff upon the corporation’s
books.
I am led to the conclusion that I have reached largely by the case of
Jackson v. Smietanka (267 Fed., 932), a case recently decided in Illinois,
wherein the facts were that Jackson, as receiver for some railroad company,
was allowed by order of the court, $2,000 per month for a number of years
prior to the taking effect of the income-tax act of 1918. When a final set
tlement came Jackson as receiver was allowed $100,000 additional for his
services, over and beyond the $2,000 a month that he had been collecting
theretofore. It was understood throughout the receivership that when the
same was finally settled he was to be allowed additional compensation. The
order of the court allowing that additional compensation proportioned that
allowance over the years 1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917, in practically equal
amounts. Of course, Jackson contemplated paying an income tax; he con
ceded that, but the question the court had before it was whether Jackson
ought to pay according to the law of 1918, or whether he ought to pay ac
cording to the law that was in force in 1914, 1915, and so on. The court
held that he ought to pay as of the time, and under the law in force at the
time the final settlement and final allowance was made.
This Jackson case is the one that I find nearest to the facts in this case.
As I stated in the beginning, the case is a close and difficult one, but I have
concluded, both upon the reasoning and under the authority of the Jackson
case, that the judgment should be for the defendant. It is so ordered.
(T. D. 3164.)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Exempt Corporations—Educational Institutions, where Profits
Inure to Private Stockholders.
A corporation organized for the purpose of conducting a military school
for profit, the stock of which is owned entirely by the officers, directors,
and teachers of the institution, is not exempt from income tax as an edu
cational institution, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or individual, within the meaning of sub
division 6, section 231, revenue act of 1918.
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2. Private Stockholders or Individuals—Officers, Directors, and
Teachers of Military School.
The term “private” is not used in the statute in contradistinction to
“official,” whether the latter be used in a military or an institutional sense,
but as the antonym of “public,” the supposed beneficiary of the benevolent
activities of an institution devoted exclusively to public betterment; private
pecuniary profit and gain is the test to be applied, and the officers, directors,
and teachers of a military school corporation, owning the stock thereof, are
“private stockholders” within the meaning of the act.
3. Deductions—Failure to Appeal to Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
A taxpayer can not claim a deduction in court for the first time, where,
in its claim for refund filed precedent to bringing suit, it did not claim the
right to such deduction or assert that it had failed to take it in computing
net income in its return, or that it had failed to take credit for it, and
where, consequently, a claim for the deduction was never presented to
the commissioner of internal revenue for his decision.
4. Deductions—Expenses—Capital Investments—Cost of New
Buildings.
No deduction as expenses is allowed by the law in any case in respect
of any amount paid out for new buildings, or for permanent improvements
or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.
Treasury Department,
Office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Washington, D. C.
To collectors of internal revenue and others concerned:
The appended decision of the district court of the United States for
the western district of Missouri, dated March 23, 1921, in the case of The
Kemper Military School v. George F. Crutchley, collector, is published for
the information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
M. F. West,
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Approved May 11, 1921:
A. W. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury.
District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the
Western District of Missouri.
The Kemper Military School, plaintiff, v. George F. Crutchley, defendant.
[Decided Mar. 23, 1921.]
memorandum of final hearing.
Van Valkenburgh, Judge: The plaintiff in this action seeks to recover
the sum of $52,166.81 income taxes, with interest and penalty, alleged to
have been illegally exacted from the plaintiff by the defendant for the year
1918. The basis of plaintiff’s alleged right to recover the above sum is that
it is exempt from tax as an educational institution, which was organized
and operated exclusively for educational purposes, and that no part of its
net earnings inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual.
This defense is asserted under the following exemptions specifically pro
vided by the congress:
Corporations organized and operated exclusively for religious, char
itable, scientific, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or individual.
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The plaintiff was incorporated June 15, 1909, under the provisions of
chapter 12, article 9, of the revised statutes of Missouri, 1899, governing the
formation of private corporations for manufacturing and business purposes.
This statute appears as article 7 of chapter 33 of the revised statutes of
1909, concerning private corporations, and deals with corporations organized
for pecuniary profit and gain. Plaintiff was not organized under the article
of the same chapter, which deals with benevolent, religious, scientific, edu
cational, and miscellaneous associations not intended for pecuniary gain or
profit.
The school was originally of individual ownership. For many years
prior to its incorporation it was owned by Col. T. A. Johnston, now its
president and principal stockholder. He purchased it originally for approx
imately $12,000; since which time large additions and betterments have
been made until its present total assets are shown to be $348,796.01, its
liabilities $96,522.88, and its net resources $252,273.13. Its present attend
ance totals about 435 pupils. In 1918 and 1919, during war activities, it
had a few over 500. In 1918 the charge was $600 per pupil for tuition,
board, and lights. The charge now has been raised to $700. In addition
thereto it sells to the pupils uniforms and books, upon which it makes a
profit.
It receives minor items of income from other sources which do not
require detailed consideration.
For the calendar year 1918 its gross income amounted to $205,153.26, of
which the sum of $5,083.11 was received from sources other than tuition;
after making statutory deductions the net income remaining amounted to
$79,788.01. The figures involved are not in dispute except as to some claims
for deduction to which reference will be hereafter made.
When the school was incorporated Colonel Johnston transferred the prop
erty to the corporation, receiving stock therefor. The remaining shares of
stock were subscribed for by teachers, and the officers and board of di
rectors are made up of such. These teachers paid for their stock out of
their earnings. A dividend of 6 per cent. has been paid upon all stock
since the date of the incorporation.
That the corporation is operated exclusively for educational purposes
may be conceded. If the law had stopped there and had evidenced the
purpose of exempting all such, the contention of the government would be
without merit, but the law further provides that, not only must the corpora
tion be organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes, but
that no part of its net earnings should inure to the benefit of any private
stockholder or individual. The case of State ex rel J. L. Sillers v. Johnston
(214 Mo., 656), in which this same school was under discussion, is not in
point. There the school was exempt under a provision of the state con
stitution and statute which exempts from taxation real estate “used exclu
sively for schools.” The element of private pecuniary gain was not
involved; and, furthermore, the construction of a state court upon a state
constitution or law could not affect a federal statute of different intend
ment and uncontrolled by state laws.
This corporation, while devoted to educational purposes, was confessedly
organized for private pecuniary profit and gain. Its teachers all receive
salaries. In addition thereto, they have all, including Colonel Johnston,
received an annual dividend of 6 per cent. upon their stock since the date
the corporation was organized. While under the terms of the statute we
are concerned chiefly with net earnings, nevertheless it may appropriately
be remarked that the increase in value of the school property inures to the
stockholders of this business corporation. It might at any time be sold and
the purchase price divided proportionately to such holdings. Upon ultimate
dissolution the holders of these shares of stock would receive the proceeds
of the property, including accumulated income.
The chief insistence is that because all the shareholders are officers,
directors, and teachers in the institution they are not “private stockholders
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or individuals.” This involves a narrowness of definition that can not be
entertained in view of the obvious purpose and spirit of the act. The dis
tinction is not between private and official, whether the latter be used in a
military or an institutional sense. The word “private” as here used is the
antonym of “public”—a private stockholder as distinguished from the
general public—the supposedly beneficiary of the benevolent activities of
an institution devoted exclusively to public betterment. Private pecuniary
profit and gain is the test to be applied. This corporation was, and is,
undeniably organized and operated for that purpose.
It does not detract, even in small degree, from the merit and worthy
service of the plaintiff, as a valuable institution of learning, to hold, as we
must, that it is not exempt from the tax imposed.
Plaintiff further contends that—
Even if it were liable to pay said taxes, they should not be collected for
the year 1918 because it expended in the necessary furniture and fixtures
the sum of $13,086.68 and for buildings and other necessary improvement
$81,188.35, amounting in the aggregate to $94,275.03, which amount was
expended for the upkeep and expansion of the plaintiff’s plant and for the
comforts and necessities of said school.
To this claim the defendant answers that plaintiff, in its appeal to the
commissioner of internal revenue in its claim for the abatement of said
taxes and for refund, never at any time asserted or claimed that it had
failed to take credit for any deduction in its said return of income for the
year 1918, which it was entitled to take, in computing its net income for
that year, under the act of congress, and that said claim was never at any
time presented by the plaintiff to the commissioner of internal revenue for
his consideration and decision thereon; further, that in computing its net
income for the year 1918 plaintiff deducted, in its said return of income
for said year, a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear, and tear
of the property used in its trade or business, including a reasonable allow
ance for obsolescence. These allegations of the answer are sustained by
the testimony. The law provides for a reasonable allowance for exhaustion,
wear and tear, etc., as conceded by defendant, and as claimed by plaintiff
in its return and allowed by the collector and commissioner. It further
provides that in computing net income no deduction shall in any case be
allowed in respect of any amount paid out for new buildings, or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate. It follows that this claim for deduction, in the sum
of $94,275.03, or any part thereof, can not be indulged.
It appearing that the grounds upon which plaintiff relies for recovery
are untenable, and there being no dispute that the amount of the tax levied
was correct, if plaintiff’s contentions are not sustained, it follows that
judgment must be entered for the defendant, and it is so ordered.
Howard F. Farrington announces the opening of offices in the
Woolworth building, Watertown, New York.
Arthur Anderson announces the opening of an office in the National
City building, 42nd street and Madison avenue, New York.
Mackay, Irons & Co. announce the removal of their office to 165 Broad
way, New York, and the admission to partnership of Douglas H. Strachan.

Clinton H. Montgomery & Co. announce the removal of their offices to
1100-1107 Bitting building, Wichita, Kansas, and the opening of an office
at 229 Frisco building, Joplin, Missouri.
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